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The definition and operationalization of wealth information in population surveys and the 
corresponding microdata requires a wide range of more or less normative assumptions.  How-
ever, the decisions made in both the pre- and post-data-collection stage may interfere consid-
erably with the substantive research question. Looking at wealth data from the German SOEP, 
this paper focuses on the impact of collecting information at the individual rather than house-
hold level, and on “imputation and editing” as a means of dealing with measurement error.  
First, we assess how the choice of unit of aggregation or unit of analysis affects wealth distri-
bution and inequality analysis. Obviously, when measured in “per capita household” terms, 
wealth is less unequally distributed than at the individual level. This is the result of significant 
redistribution within households, and also provides evidence of a significant persisting gender 
wealth gap. 
Secondly, we find multiple imputation to be an effective means of coping with selective non-
response. There is a significant impact of imputation on the share of wealth holders (increas-
ing on average by 15%) and also on aggregate wealth (plus 30%). However, with respect to 
inequality, the results are ambiguous. Looking at the major outcome variable for the whole 
population—net worth—the Gini coefficient decreases, whereas a top-sensitive measure dou-
bles. The non-random selectivity built into the missing process and the consideration of this 
selectivity in the imputation process clearly contribute to this finding.  
Obviously, the treatment of measurement errors after data collection, especially with respect 
to the imputation of missing values, affects cross-national comparability and thus may require 
some cross-national harmonization of the imputation strategies applied to the various national 
datasets.  
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The definition and operationalization of wealth information in population surveys and the 
corresponding microdata requires a wide range of more or less normative assumptions.  How-
ever, such decisions may interfere considerably with the substantive research question at 
hand, as has been shown, for example, by the research on imputation of missing income data 
and its effects on income inequality and mobility (see e.g., Frick & Grabka 2003, Biewen 
2001). Also the choice of the time interval chosen to measure income may cause income ine-
quality results to differ between annual and monthly income data (see Wagner et al 2001 for 
the case of Germany using SOEP data, and Böheim and Jenkins 2000 for results based on the 
BHPS in the UK). Looking at wealth data from the German SOEP as prepared for the LWS 
database, this paper focuses on two of the aforementioned issues: the impact of imputation 
and editing, and the choice of the aggregation unit.  
Firstly, missing data due to item non-response is a major problem for all micro-data, and an 
even more acute problem for economic outcome variables such as income and wealth. Not 
only does the decision to use imputation rather than weighting play a role (or assuming miss-
ing at random by not dealing with missing data), but even more so, the choice of the imputa-
tion procedure. Using micro panel data on annual income from the UK BHPS, the Australian 
HILDA survey, and the German SOEP, Frick & Grabka 2006 provide empirical evidence that 
incorporating longitudinal information significantly improves the quality of the imputation 
results. These surveys make use of single imputation techniques (for income variables), which 
may be criticized for not sufficiently considering the uncertainty embedded in the imputation 
process. This phenomenon is taken into account by Kennickell (1998), who uses data from the 
US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to show the relevance of applying multiple imputa-
tion techniques, as well as by Spiess and Goebel (2005) based on a unique linked dataset from 
Finnish survey and register data.    
Secondly, in contrast to many other surveys, the SOEP surveys wealth data at the individual 
level (as does the BHPS), making it possible to investigate how the choice of the aggregation 
unit affects wealth distribution and inequality analysis (including the decomposition of ine-
quality). The main hypothesis here is that household-based information is more equally dis-
tributed given the internal redistribution process embedded in the “pooling and equal sharing 
assumption” implicitly made in such welfare-oriented analyses. Following from this, a major Discussion Papers   672 
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advantage of individualized wealth data is the opportunity to investigate the size and determi-
nants of a possible “gender wealth gap”. If results differ for the two approaches (based on 
aggregated or household-level versus individual-level information), this may provide useful 
information for other countries where no individualized wealth data is available, controlling 
for similar household structures (size and composition).  
Section 2 of this paper briefly describes the underlying SOEP data in general, as well as how 
the wealth data was collected in the survey year 2002, including the editing and imputation 
techniques applied to this data. Section 3 of the paper deals with inequality analysis, focusing 
on the choice of the aggregation unit, comparing results on inequality derived from both ag-
gregation levels. Section 4 deals with the scope and impact of multiple imputations. In the 
final section, we conclude, giving specific consideration to the relevance of our results for 
cross-national comparative research.  
2  The data  
The Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal survey of individu-
als living in private households in Germany (Frick & Haisken-DeNew 2005). Recent devel-
opments and plans for upcoming waves are described in Wagner et al (2006). The survey was 
started in West Germany in 1984 and extended to East Germany in 1990. The initial sample 
included over 12,000 respondents, with all individuals aged 17 and over in each household 
being interviewed.  In the years 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2006, new sub-samples were 
drawn which approximately doubled the initial sample size. The sample analyzed here com-
prises approximately 12,700 households with about 24,000 respondents (plus their children) 
surveyed in the year 2002. That year, the individual questionnaire included a special module 
focusing on wealth (see Appendix A1).  
This section included questions on seven different wealth components:  
•  owner-occupied property (including debt)  
•  other property (including debt)  
•  financial assets 
•  private pensions (including life insurance and building savings contracts)  
•  business assets 
•  tangible assets  
•  consumer credit  Discussion Papers   672 
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Potential shortcomings of this fairly extensive wealth questionnaire arise from the exclusion 
of cars in the measure of tangible assets1 and the lack of information about pension entitle-
ments through both company pensions and the German statutory social pension fund (Ge-
setzliche Rentenversicherung). This information is difficult to collect because individuals may 
not be aware of the amount they might be entitled to through these forms of social security. A 
further restriction comes with the use of a lower threshold of 2,500 euros for financial and 
tangible assets and consumer credits. This was set in order to reduce the burden on respon-
dents by not asking them to state negligible amounts. As such, the overall measure of total 
wealth and even more so the share of wealth holders are likely to be understated and biased 
against very small wealth holdings. A further limitation of the SOEP 2002 wealth question-
naire arises due to the lack of wealth data on children. The SOEP only surveys individuals 
aged 17 and over. Thus any wealth held by younger persons is not considered here, although 
it may have been captured if a household-based questionnaire was used. In any case, given the 
minor relevance of wealth holdings by children, this aspect can be ignored. 
Despite these shortcomings, when the total wealth of private households measured by SOEP 
2002 is compared with the national balance sheets, the survey does quite well in several cate-
gories (see Appendix 2). Housing wealth components match very well, as do net business 
assets. The biggest discrepancy is in the more heterogeneous categories of financial assets and 
tangible assets, but in these two cases the questions ask respondents only to report balances 
over 2,500 euros and do not refer to all the components found in the balance sheets. The over-
all value of the “financial assets” owned by a given person might consist of numerous single 
items and forgetting one of them yields a higher probability of understating the true value. 
This is less likely in the case of housing wealth, given that most people do not own more than 
one home.  
As in other surveys, the SOEP has also encountered relatively low response rates with wealth 
questions. However, there are two types of non-response which are important in this context. 
The first occurs when for an otherwise responding person a subset of information (i.e., a sin-
gle variable) is missing. This is referred to as item non-response (INR). As an example, the 
share of item non-response for the market value of financial assets is about 16%. The second 
                                                                          
1 The SOEP asked for tangible assets in the form of gold, jewelry, coins or valuable collections but not for the 
value of all of an individual’s personal belongings, as usually considered for wealth in national balance sheets. Discussion Papers   672 
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type is the partial unit non-response (PUNR) and refers to cases where one or more, but not 
all persons in the household refuse to answer the questionnaire. 2 Obviously, when aggregat-
ing information across all adult household members, such partial unit non-response behavior 
most likely yields an understatement of the true aggregate, if it is not corrected by means of 
imputation.  
As such, there is a need to find out about any selectivity of measurement error (and thus a 
need for editing and imputation). We do so by estimating the probability for “inconsistency or 
INR”. However, in order to analyze such issues, we must control for potential selectivity into 
the state of ownership (of assets and debts). For example, more highly educated individuals 
are also more likely to hold assets (or debts). Such selection can be controlled for here by 
means of a Heckman selection correction (see Heckman 1979). We run two models estimat-
ing the probability of measurement error in a comprehensive measure of “total assets” and of 
“total debts” (in each case controlling for sample selection). All results are presented in Ap-
pendix 3.  
Basic findings for the selection model include: 
•  Assets (and debts) are more common among persons of higher age (although decreasing 
among the elderly), males, persons with high education, and those living in rural areas. 
Controlling for employment status, we find the self-employed and civil servants to be more 
likely to possess assets, while the unemployed, pensioners and individuals out of the labor 
force are less likely to do so.  
•  From a methodological point of view, we find clear indications of interview mode effects: 
all respondents who deviate from the standard PAPI (paper-and-pencil interview) method 
show a higher probability for ownership of assets or debt. The number of interviews does 
not correlate with ownership of assets and does have a marginally negative effect on debt.  
With respect to the correlates of the probability for inconsistency / item non-response: 
•  Male respondents are less likely to show such measurement error.  
•  Higher education reduces the probability of any type of measurement error; low education 
is also found to increase the risk of inconsistent answers.  
                                                                          
2 There is a third type of non-response: unit non-response, which refers to missing information for the whole 
observation unit “household”. In panel surveys, this phenomenon is often dealt with by means of weighting 
following attrition analysis, where the weighing factor is derived from the estimation of the probability of drop-
ping out (that is, the inverse of the drop-out probability).     Discussion Papers   672 
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•  For civil servants we find the expected negative effect, indicating the increased probability 
for “complete and true” information. 
•  Self-employed persons appear to have more problems providing complete information on 
the value of their assets; however, this is not true for debts.  
•  Again, variables focusing on the interview situation significantly contribute to variance 
explanation: self-administered interviews (as well as CAPI interviews) yield a higher need 
for imputation and editing and the number of interviews increases the probability of “com-
plete and correct” information on assets, indicating a positive learning effect of repeated 
interviewing and increased confidence in the interviewer.  
Before the data can be imputed for item non-response, it needs to undergo extensive checking 
for consistency and plausibility. If values are not found to be plausible or consistent they must 
be edited. In the following we use the term “editing” to refer to cases in which an observed 
non-missing value is changed into another value: for example, when a couple co-owns a given 
wealth component, such as owner-occupied property. Here, the SOEP questionnaire asks for 
(an estimate of) the current market value of the house/flat as well as the percentage share 
owned by the individual. As such, the market value mentioned by both partners referring to 
the very same object should coincide by and large. Furthermore, if both partners are the sole 
owners of this property, their respective shares should add up to 100%. Any deviation along 
these lines is to be considered measurement error and may be corrected for through some type 
of “editing”, in contrast to “imputation”, which is carried out in the case of missing informa-
tion due to item non-response.  
The principal approach for imputing missing market values of the various wealth components 
in the SOEP is the use of a maximum-likelihood based Heckman selection model controlling 
for sample selection. In the context analyzed here, sample selection may occur if a respondent 
refuses to give a valid metric value conditional on his or her answer to a filter question about 
holding a specific wealth component. These regressions also adequately control for possible 
regional clustering effects.  Finally, in order to better incorporate the uncertainty of the impu-
tation process, a randomly chosen error term is assigned to the regression-based prediction 
(=imputation). Repeating this process five times yields a multiply imputed data set with five 
implicates. 
In what follows, we demonstrate this principle in the imputation of missing values for the 
market value of owner-occupied property. Based on the population with valid observed in-Discussion Papers   672 
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formation on the market value of their owner-occupied property, Figure 1 compares kernel 
density plots for the originally surveyed information and the respective predicted values in 
order to validate the quality of the imputation procedure. The green long-dashed curve gives 
the density of the imputed values with, and the grey short-dashed curve without randomly 
chosen residuals in contrast to the observed market values (red solid curve). Obviously, ne-
glecting residuals yields a distinct regression-to-the-mean phenomenon, that is, a strong un-
derestimation of the variance. However, the comparison of the true distribution with that of 
the prediction including the error terms for the very same observations shows a high degree of 
coincidence3, also providing confidence in the quality of out-of-sample predictions for those 
with missing values.  
Figure 1: 
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Again, based on the market values of owner-occupied property, Figure 2 demonstrates sig-
nificant differences between the distribution of the truly observed cases and those which 
                                                                          
3 The distribution of the predicted values consistently lies inside the two-sigma confidence band of the true 
distribution (not shown in figure for the sake of readability).   
4 Values higher than one million euros are trimmed in this figure. Displayed are the values of all households with 
an observed market value (5,104 households). Discussion Papers   672 
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needed to be imputed due to item non-response. Firstly, the five kernel density estimates for 
the five multiple imputations in cases with INR (these “unobserved predictions” are given as 
solid grey lines) vary much more than those for the observed cases (green lines). More impor-
tantly, the two sets of distributions are distinctively different from each other: the distributions 
of the five implicates for the imputations are more compressed and are shifted to the left as 
well. This indicates that the cases with INR are not missing at random (as already shown in 
the section above) and most likely more prominent in the lower part of the wealth distribution. 
In fact, these lower market values originate from homes situated in older buildings and in 
more rural areas, since these are smaller in size and more often occupied by elderly persons 
with long tenure. 
Figure 2: 
Comparing multiply imputed cases with item-non-response (unobserved predictions) and fictitious implicates 
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Further details on the editing and imputation strategies are given in Frick, Grabka and Marcus 
(2007); Appendix 4 gives a general overview of the scope of editing and imputation for the 
various wealth components.   
                                                                          
5 Values higher than 1 million euros are trimmed in this figure. Implicates incorporate randomly chosen residu-
als. Discussion Papers   672 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of imputed and observed values for overall (net) wealth, 
which is an aggregate measure of assets and liabilities, as well as the resulting final distribu-
tion considering all observations. We find distinct differences, particularly close to the zero 
mass as well as in the range of 50,000 to 150,000 euros, that is, the distribution of the imputed 
cases is shifted to the right and so is the final distribution.6. 
Figure 3. 
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It should be noted that imputation of missing wealth data in the SOEP is performed at the 
individual level. However, this individual information can be aggregated at the household 
level for further analysis. In the following two sections, we will focus on the effect of both 
(dis)aggregation, as well as editing and imputation, on wealth inequality in Germany in 2002. 
3  The “editing and imputation” process  
This section deals with scope and impact of multiple imputations on wealth components in the 
SOEP 2002. First, we examine the incidence of item non-response as a source of editing and 
imputation, and determine the population share affected by wealth components. Then we 
                                                                          
6 Values less than -200 thousand and more than 800 thousand euros are trimmed in this figure. The distributions 
of the five implicates as well as for the resulting composite overall wealth variable are more or less identical.  Discussion Papers   672 
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focus on the relevance of editing and imputation for aggregate wealth. Finally, we turn to the 
impact of imputations on summary statistics and inequality measures. For the sake of robust-
ness, we use a wide range of distribution statistics and several inequality measures.  
In our analysis, we need to distinguish between total population, the population holding the 
relevant wealth component, and the observed population that provides complete non-missing 
information. Our analysis in this section is based on individual-level data and unless other-
wise noted, refers to the individual’s personal share in ownership of his or her main residence, 
investment real estate, financial assets, mortgages, and other mortgaged properties. It is also 
important to note that some wealth components are only collected for balances of 2,500 euros 
or more (total financial assets, tangible assets, and non-housing debt).  
In Table 1 we find that the effect of imputation and editing for the whole population and total 
values (not shares) varies from a low 2.3% for other property, followed by business assets, 
tangible assets, owner-occupied property, and financial assets, up to almost 20% for private 
pensions. In the aggregate, the imputations and editing compounds to over 30% for total as-
sets. The variation in the imputation rates indicates that individuals’ willingness to respond to 
asset questions varies with the type of asset. In the liabilities category, the effect of imputation 
is 50% lower—about 15% in the aggregate. About 6% of the population requires editing or 
imputing other property debt, followed by other debt and around 12% for the main property 
debt. The highest prevalence of editing occurs for owner-occupied property and main property 
debt.  In Part B of the table, we focus on the population with positive wealth component hold-
ings. There we find that a greater share of the population is subject to imputation and editing, 
although to differing degrees than before, suggesting that most imputed and edited values are 
positive (this is not ex-ante clear given that the imputation process also includes the imputa-
tion of filter questions, thus allowing the imputation routine to generate a value of zero).  
The impact of imputation7 on the share of population holding wealth components (asset par-
ticipation) is found in Table 2. Asset participation increases by almost 50% for business assets 
and tangibles due to imputation (but participation is low in general; additionally, tangibles are 
only recorded for balances over 2,500 euros). For most other assets and liabilities the effect is 
in the range of 16-24% and only 3% for private pensions.  
Whereas the population share of imputed or edited wealth data varies across components, we 
find that on average, about 25-30 % of wealth has been imputed across wealth components 
                                                                          
7 From this point on, the term “imputation” will refer to both “editing and imputation.” Discussion Papers   672 
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(Table 3). The exception is business assets, where nearly 50% of wealth is either imputed or 
edited. This seems to be the component people are most reluctant to report, or more likely, the 
one they find most difficult to estimate. For debt, the average figure is 27%, with 31% for 
main property, 25% for other property debt, and 18 % for other debt (consumer credits) being 
imputed or edited. 
We find that the share of wealth imputed across components does not vary to a large extent. 
Figure 4 indicates that across the wealth distribution, the imputed wealth in each decile as a 
share of wealth in that decile does not vary to a great extent either. For the most part, it is 
around 40-50%, with 20-30% for the lower deciles. When we look at total imputed wealth, 
about 60% belongs to the top decile.  Less than 5% of total wealth is imputed below the sev-
enth decile: 7% in the 7
th, 12% in the 8
th, and 19% in the 9
th decile.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.  The median for the whole population is not 
affected by imputation, and in most cases imputation and editing changed the median by less 
than 10% among those holding the particular wealth component. This is not at all surprising 
given that ownership of several components is less than 50% and that most of the imputations 
are for the richest 10% while the rest are spread out more or less evenly across the distribution 
(Figure 4). One exception are tangible assets, among which we observe an 18.6% change in 
the median.  Imputation significantly affects the overall population means of wealth compo-
nents in a positive direction, in effect doubling it for business assets and increasing it by 
around half for most of the other components.  The change in the conditional mean is much 
smaller, in the range of 1-8%, less significant, and negative, except for business assets and 
other property debt. 
The effect of imputation on selected percentiles of wealth is presented in Table 5. Given that 
for most assets and debt we do not observe holdings until the median of the distribution, the 
greatest effect of imputation is for the higher percentile groups. Except for main property and 
main property debt, editing is performed for only a few observations. Apart from tangible 
assets and non-housing debt, there is a small effect of imputation at the top of the distribution. 
For the whole population, imputation has a significant effect reducing inequality as measured 
by the Gini and the half-squared coefficient of variation (HSCV) (Table 6). The HSCV is 
always considerably more reactive than Gini. This can be explained by the imputation proc-
ess, where values are added in the upper tail of the distribution, increasing the number of 
observations and effectively reducing inequality in the upper end of the distribution. We also 
redo this exercise on the basis of observations with positive values only, and find that al-Discussion Papers   672 
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though inequality is reduced, the imputation process now has an ambiguous effect on inequal-
ity. For owner-occupied property (and the associated debt), financial assets and pension assets 
the effect of imputation has a smaller effect on inequality, whereas it has a larger effect on 
investment property, business assets, and other property debt. Once again the effect in most 
cases is not significant. 
Up to now we have focused mainly on components of net worth and the effect of imputation 
on their summary statistics. Next we turn to overall wealth or net worth, which is a summary 
measure created as the sum of all assets less liabilities. Table 7 provides summary information 
on observed and final net worth. As was the case for the components of wealth, mean net 
worth increases by 35.7% due to the imputation process and by 12.8% for those with positive 
net worth. Across the distribution, as before, percentiles close to the median are affected most, 
although we also see an effect at the bottom of the distribution due to imputation for the fifth 
percentile. The change in inequality is ambiguous. The Gini is reduced and the half-squared 
coefficient of variation more than doubles. The overall proportion of the poor measured by 
the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke measure FGT (for alpha=0, that is, the head count ratio) is 
reduced by 5%. The average normalized poverty gap (FGT1) and the average squared normal-
ized poverty gap (FGT2) are each reduced by about 38 %. 
4  The “choice of aggregation unit” 
If provided with the choice, many researchers will choose individual-level wealth information 
over the household level. Wealth data at the individual level is a better match to other welfare-
oriented data on income or satisfaction, for example, and if available for multiple waves, 
individual wealth data vastly improves longitudinal and mobility analysis, especially in the 
case of household split-offs. Unfortunately, the bulk of the available survey data provides 
only household or family-level data but not individual data. The SOEP 2002 offers a unique 
opportunity to compare the individual and the household levels.  
As mentioned before, the “equal sharing assumption” implicit in household-based welfare 
analysis is thought to give rise to a more equal wealth distribution than individual-level analy-
sis. In this section, we explore this hypothesis using the German SOEP data collected at the 
individual level and then aggregated to the household level.  First, we look at the effect of the 
choice of the aggregation unit on a wide range of (simple) distribution statistics and then 
decompose inequality by age and gender. We also examine the sensitivity of inequality meas-Discussion Papers   672 
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ures to outliers at the top of the distribution. We distinguish three types of units of analysis: 
individual, household per capita based on individual data, and household per capita based on 
household-level data. The household per capita approach based on individual data uses 
households that completed interviews,8 whereas the household per capita approach based on 
household data may include individuals that did not complete interviews (PUNR). As a result, 
the household size and wealth aggregates may differ slightly across these groups, being larger 
in the latter. 
Table 8 reveals that data analyzed at the individual level (comparing (a) and (b)) yields 
greater wealth for the top 10% of the distribution. The minimum increases and the maximum 
decreases when using the household per capita approach and the means and sum are approxi-
mately constant. 
Comparing (a) and (b) also shows the expected decrease in inequality (especially for top-
sensitive measures as HSCV) and poverty due to the redistribution process within private 
households. The Gini coefficients are significantly different from each other, whereas the 
half-squared coefficients of variation are not.  
Comparing the two household per capita approaches (comparing (b) and (c)) we find there is 
an increase in inequality for the "pure" household approach (c). Once again, only the Gini 
coefficient is significantly different across the different unit types. 
As a check, we also examine (in the right panel of Table 8) the corresponding information for 
disposable income using the exact same definition of population as used in columns (b) and 
(c) (due to the lack of completely individualized income, we need to exclude children from 
the "pure" individual approach). We find that, as in the case of wealth, inequality increases 
when we change the unit of observation from individual to household per capita information.  
Similarly, we observe an increase in net worth for upper quantiles: although the wealth mean 
and median falls, the opposite occurs for income. This is partly caused by the fact that there 
are virtually no households with zero income, but many with zero (or negative) net wealth.  
The "pure" individual approach (left panel of Table 8, column (a)) appears to be the most 
appropriate way to perform this type of welfare-based analysis. However, for the sake of 
cross-national comparability, one may have to accept the household per capita approach at the 
                                                                          
8 That is, all individuals within the household completed the interview. Discussion Papers   672 
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individual level (b), which resembles the way standard income distribution analysis is done.9 
It must be emphasized, though, that this approach yields the lowest inequality levels due to 
the implicit re-distribution process within households. Another point that should be made is 
that if one were to use the household-based household per capita approach, the inequality and 
poverty values would fall precisely between the two individual-based approaches. 
Next, we examine the effect the choice of the aggregation unit has on subgroup indices. Here 
we focus solely on the two individual approaches, that is, the “pure” individual approach 
compared to the one where we aggregate wealth across all adult household members and 
reassign the resulting per capita value to each. There is a clear pattern for the Gini coefficient 
shown in Table 9: the youngest profit the most from the implicit redistribution process within 
the household, and this effect diminishes with increasing age and falls below average starting 
with those aged 35 and over. The picture for the HSCV is not as clear as for the Gini, but here 
again we find the highest "redistribution" effect in favor of the youngest population. Since this 
somewhat mixed picture may be induced by outliers, we repeat the analysis and top-code at 
the 99
th percentile of the wealth distribution. Although inequality decreases, there is not much 
change in the Gini.  For the HSCV the picture becomes much clearer and consistent across 
age groups. The youngest still benefit the most and the internal redistribution effects are be-
low average for all starting at age 45. Using the top-coded data and a top-sensitive inequality 
measure, however, this effect is again diminished for the older population.  
Decomposition of inequality by gender indicates that women profit more from within-
household redistribution than men, and this effect is much stronger using a top-sensitive ine-
quality measure. Figure 5 reveals that moving from an individual to a household per capita 
perspective “increases” the net worth of women from 69,000 to 81,000 euros, while men 
“lost” 15,000 euros on average to the redistribution process. However, this change is driven 
solely by married couples. Whereas both unmarried men and unmarried women gain about 
10,000 euros, it is married women who profit most from household internal redistribution, 
moving from 85,000 to 100,000 euros. In other words, a household-based approach hides an 
existing gender wealth gap of approximately 50,000 euros. According to our inequality results 
based on the HSCV (Table 9), wealth inequality among women overall is reduced by internal 
redistribution by as much as 50%, while there is a major increase to be found among men. 
Once we repeat the analysis with top-coding we find that although women do benefit more 
                                                                          
9 One should note that children below respondent’s age (17 and over) are effectively excluded from this type of 
analysis. Discussion Papers   672 
5 Conclusions and future prospects 
 
 
  19  
than men from within-household distribution, the difference in the effect compared to men is 
only one percentage point for the Gini, but about eight percentage points for the HSCV.   
5  Conclusions and future prospects  
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to provide an assessment of the effect of 
editing and multiple imputations in the 2002 SOEP. This was done in the aggregate and at 
individual level using descriptive and inequality measures. We find multiple imputation to be 
an effective means of coping with selective non-response. There is a significant impact of 
imputation on the share of wealth holders (leading to a 15% increase on average) and also on 
wealth components (30% increase on average). However, with respect to inequality we find 
ambiguous results. The Gini and HSCV for the wealth components are reduced for the whole 
population. For those with a component there is variation in the effect on the two inequality 
measures. We observe a reduction in inequality for owner-occupied property, financial assets, 
private pensions, tangibles, and other debts, and an increase for other property, business assets 
and property debt.  Looking at the comprehensive outcome variable for the whole popula-
tion—net worth—the Gini decreases, whereas the top-sensitive HSCV doubles. The non-
random selectivity built into the missing process and the consideration of this selectivity in 
the imputation process clearly contribute to this finding.  
A second goal is to provide an initial assessment of how the choice of unit of aggregation/unit 
of analysis affects the wealth distribution and inequality analysis. In accordance with our 
hypotheses, wealth measured in “household per capita” terms is less unequally distributed as a 
result of significant redistribution within households, also providing proof of the existing 
gender wealth gap. 
With respect to future work on the production of cross-nationally comparative wealth infor-
mation (such as LWS), one may want to develop a more comprehensive wealth measure by 
also considering (surveying or simulating) public pension entitlements. These may indeed 
turn out to be more relevant in some countries than in others, thus also exerting an effect on 
the level and structure of individuals’ wealth portfolios.  In any case, as has been shown 
above, the post-data-collection treatment of measurement errors, especially with respect to 
imputation of missing values due to non-response, will have an impact on cross-national 
comparability and may thus require some harmonization above and beyond the data collection 
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the use of individual versus household-level data may require sacrificing the “superior” indi-
vidual-level data for the sake of cross-national comparability.    
In future research, we plan to compare SOEP-based results to results derived from the US 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in terms of the scope and correlates of missing values, as 
well as the resulting impact of multiple imputations. 
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  Table 1 
Incidence of item non-response: source for editing and imputation (population share affected, unweighted) 






























Observed  86.9 97.7 86.5  80.6  93.4 91.8  67.6 88.2  93.8 93.3  83.6  63.4 
Edited  4.0 0.4 0.0  0.0  -  - 5.4 2.3  0.2  - 3.6  5.5 
Imputed  9.1 1.9 13.5  19.4 6.6 8.2  27.0 9.5  6.0  6.7  12.8  31.1 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 100 100  100 100  100  100 
n=23,892                    






























Observed  73.5 81.5 77.6  67.5  66.8 71.5  57.4 70.3  79.3 84.3  69.2  54.0 
Edited  9.8 2.9 0.1  0.0  -  - 7.1 9.7  2.9  - 9.0  7.4 
Imputed  16.8 15.6 22.3  32.5  33.2 28.5  35.5 20.0  17.8 15.7  21.9  38.7 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 100 100  100 100  100  100 
N of obs. (cumulated across 5 MI)  47,985 14,645 53,870  61,115  5,995  11,315  90,750 26,630 7,420  13,315  39,430 86,963 
N of obs. (basic N)  9,597 2,929 10,774  12,307 1,247 2,263  18,185 5,326 1,484  2,663  7,886  17,393 
Note: Calculations are based on flags that refer to total market value and not personal share. 
1 Individuals aged 17 and over. 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors calculations.  Discussion Papers   672 
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   Observed 
1  Final 
2  % deviation 
3  
       
Owner-occupied property  31.3  36.2  15.7 
Other Property  8.2  10.0  22.0 
Financial Assets  36.2  43.0  18.8 
Private Pensions  35.1  36.2  3.1 
Business Assets  2.7  4.2  55.6 
Tangible Assets  5.8  8.4  44.8 
Total Assets  63.2  73.5  16.3 
 
        
Main Property Debt  15.1  18.2  20.5 
Other Property Debt  3.7  4.6  24.3 
Other Debt  9.1  10.7  17.6 
Total Debt  40.0  46.2  15.5 
Population: Adult population (17 years and over) with interview. Weighted. 
1 Only those with observed values are included. 
2 After editing and imputation. 
3 Calculated as (final-observed)/final. 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  
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   Observed 
1   Final 
2    % Share imputed 
3  
     
 
Owner-occupied property  2,408,607  3,421,346  29.6 
Other Property  816,755  1,099,007  25.7 
Financial Assets  500,767  670,272  25.3 
Private Pensions  425,161  613,777  30.7 
Business Assets  344,622  682,977  49.5 
Tangible Assets  64,067  95,168  32.7 
Total Assets  4,559,979 6,582,548  30.7 
      
Main Property Debt  407,168  593,092  31.3 
Other Property Debt  227,194  302,551  24.9 
Other Debt  148,468  180,414  17.7 
Total Debt  782,831  1,076,058  27.3 
Net Worth  3,777,148 5,506,490  31.4 
Note:  
1 For each component only those with observed personal share and value are included. Totals are 
based on the sum of components and not on individual data. 
2 After editing and imputation 
3 Share imputed is calculated as (final-observed)/final 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  
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  Mean  Median 
  Observed 




3  Observed 









57,660 51.7  0  0  0.0 
se  (296)  (311)             
 if PR>0  152,360  143,546 -5.8  125,000  117,313 -6.1 
se  (734)  (579)             
Other property (IR)  14,847 23,493  58.2  0  0  0.0 
se  (464)  (605)             
 if IR>0  189,332  191,637 1.2  100,000  90,000 -10.0 
se  (4,918)  (4,720)             
Financial Assets (TFA)  8,264 11,620  40.6  0  0  0.0 
se  (159)  (156)             
 if TFA>0  28,066 25,768  -8.2  10,000  10,000  0.0 
se  (456)  (335)             
Private Pensions (PA)  8,105 11,772  45.2  0  0  0.0 
se  (173)  (167)             
 if PA>0  25,028 23,011  -8.1  10,000  9,980 -0.2 
se  (455)  (320)             
Business Assets (BA)  8,325 18,223  118.9  0  0  0.0 
se  (1,001)  (1,609)             
 if BA>0  301,674 363,117  20.4  50,000  50,569  1.1 
se  (31,939)  (31,907)             
Tangible Assets (DRCL)  1,273 2,002  57.3  0  0  0.0 
se  (76)  (82)             
 if DRCL>0  22,088 21,136  -4.3  8,000  9,492  18.6 
se  (1,148)  (853)             
Main Property Debt (MG)  6,995 11,296  61.5  0  0  0.0 
se  (90)  (106)             
 if MG>0  53,108  50,673 -4.6  42,500  39,711 -6.6 
se  (467)  (390)             
Other Property Debt (OMG)  4,598 7,333  59.5  0  0  0.0 
se  (180)  (242)             
 if OMG>0  113,780 118,064 3.8  56,000  58,110  3.8 
se  (3,680)  (3,668)             
Other Debt (NHD)  2,096 2,981  42.2  0  0  0.0 
se  (111)  (119)             
 if NHD>0  26,545  26,744 0.8  9,650  10,000 3.6 
se  (1,224)  (1,050)             
           
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses. Results are corrected for multiple imputation. Star (*) indicates means are significantly 
different at the 95% level. 
1  Only those with observed personal share and value are included.
 2 After editing and imputation 
3 (final-obs)/obs 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors´ calculations. 
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   Observed 
1   Edited     Imputed     Final 
2    %  
change
3 
Owner-occupied property (PR)                
1  0    0   0   0   - 
5  0    32,500   0   0   - 
10  0    50,000   0   0   - 
25  0    71,250   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0    102,500   76,565   0   - 
75  60,000    137,500   128,547   90,000   50 
90  150,000    188,750   200,000   153,388   2 
95  200,000    219,000   253,040   215,000   8 
99  400,000     325,000     419,815     400,000   0 
n(MI) =   101,500    6,065   11,895   119,460    
Other property (IR)                
1  0    750   0   0    - 
5  0    6,250    0    0   - 
10  0   27,500    0    0   - 
25  0   36,250    0    0   - 
50 (median)  0   70,000    0    0   - 
75  0    137,500   24,002   0    - 
90  0    182,000   114,763   0    - 
95  63,912   224,665    217,757   87,500   37 
99  300,000     925,000     666,608     300,000    0 
n(MI) =  110,785   490   8,185   119,460    
Financial Assets (TFA)                  
1  0   0   0   0   - 
5  0   0   0   0   - 
10  0   0   0   0   - 
25  0   0   2,500   0   - 
50 (median)  0   49000   7,520   0   - 
75  5,000   148500   16,415   9,000   80 
90  20,000   181500   31,259   25,000   25 
95  40,000   181500   48,140   45,000   13 
99  125,000     181500     120,000     125,000   0 
n(MI) =  99,900   50   19,510   119,460    
Private Pensions (PA)                  
1  0   10000   0   0   - 
5  0   10000   0   0   - 
10  0   10000   0   0   - 
25  0   10000   2,500   0   - 
50 (median)  0   10000   5,982   0   - 
75  5,000   10000   15,124   7,669   53 
90  20,000   10000   32,905   23,736   19 
95  40,000   10000   53,412   40,000   0 
99  100,000     10000     128,203     102,000   2 
n(MI) =  96,285   5   23,170   119,460    
Table 5 
The effect of editing and imputation on summary statistics of wealth components: quantiles (weighted, indi-
vidual level) Discussion Papers   672 
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Table 5 (continued) 
   Observed  
1   Edited     Imputed  Final 
2    % 
3
Business Assets (BA)                           
1  0   n.a   0   0   - 
5  0   n.a   0   0   - 
10  0   n.a   0   0   - 
25  0   n.a   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0   n.a   0   0   - 
75  0   n.a   0   0   - 
90  0   n.a   48,669   0   - 
95  0   n.a   142,382   0   - 
99  90,000     n.a     1,002,906     144,000    60 
n(MI) =  111,530     -     7,930     119,460      
Tangible Assets (DRCL)                           
1  0   n.a   0   0   - 
5  0   n.a   0   0   - 
10  0   n.a   0   0   - 
25  0   n.a   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0   n.a   0   0   - 
75  0   n.a   4,787   0   - 
90  0   n.a   13,877   0   - 
95  3,500   n.a   22,142   6,000   71 
99  20,000     n.a     60,486     28,463    42 
n(MI) =  109,670   -   9,790   119,460    
Main Property Debt (MG)                
1  0   0   0   0   - 
5  0   0   0   0   - 
10  0   0   0   0   - 
25  0   0   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0   23,540   0   0   - 
75  0   46,250   24,682   0   - 
90  20,000   75,000   56,594   33,250   66 
95  50,000   90,000   76,683   60,000   20 
99  117,500     150,000     138,762     120,000    2 
n(MI) =  103,115   4,270   12,075   119,460    
Other Property Debt (OMG)               
1  0   0   0   0   - 
5  0   0   0   0   - 
10  0   0   0   0   - 
25  0   20,000   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0   53,750   0   0   - 
75  0   86,250   0   0   - 
90  0   211,250   27,853   0   - 
95  0   211,250   74,943   0   - 
99  104,908     4,000,000     207,949     104,908    0 
n(MI) =  111,835   290   7,335   119,460    
Other Debt (NHD)                
1  0   n.a   0   0   - 
5  0   n.a   0   0   - 
10  0   n.a   0   0   - 
25  0   n.a   0   0   - 
50 (median)  0   n.a   0   0   - 
75  0   n.a   0   0   - 
90  0   n.a   13,717   3,000   - 
95  8,000   n.a   25,531   10,000   25 
99  40,000     n.a     139,440     50,000    25 
n(MI) =  111,410     -     8,050     119,460       
Note: 
1 Only those with observed personal share and value are included.
 2 After editing and imputation.
 3 (final-obs)/obs  
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  Discussion Papers   672 
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   Total Population     Population with component 
   Observed 
1   Final 
2    % change
 3  Observed 
1   Final 
2    % change
 3 
Owner-occupied 
property                           
Gini  0.814  0.761   -6.5 *  0.345   0.341   -1.3 
se  (0.002)    (0.003)          (0.004)     (0.003)       
HSCV  2.314  1.688   -27.0  *  0.298   0.293   -1.6 
se  (0.064)    (0.059)          (0.015)     (0.019)       
Other property                         
Gini  0.968  0.961   -0.7  * 0.590   0.608    3.1 
se  (0.002)    (0.002)          (0.017)     (0.017)       
HSCV  43.643  38.848   -11.0   2.995   3.434   14.6 
se  (9.555)    (5.395)          (0.744)     (0.511)       
Financial Assets                        
Gini  0.871  0.833   -4.3  * 0.637   0.612    -4.0 
se  (0.005)    (0.005)          (0.009)     (0.008)       
HSCV  12.167    8.861    -27.2 *  4.019   3.527   -12.2 
se  (2.380)    (1.659)          (0.817)     (0.689)       
Private Pensions                        
Gini  0.869  0.832   -4.2  * 0.656   0.644    -1.9 
se  (0.005)    (0.004)          (0.010)     (0.007)       
HSCV  12.083    8.309    -31.2 *  4.302   3.658   -15.0 
se  (3.339)    (2.095)          (1.278)     (0.984)       
Business Assets                        
Gini  0.994  0.993   -0.1  * 0.783   0.825    5.5 
se  (0.001)    (0.001)          (0.037)     (0.019)       
HSCV  938.845  627.704   -33.1    24.884   25.245    1.4 
se  (414.253)    (130.341)          (11.360)    (5.199)       
Tangible Assets                        
Gini  0.977  0.966   -1.1  * 0.626   0.598    -4.5 
se  (0.001)    (0.001)          (0.015)     (0.012)       
HSCV  133.013  77.029   -42.1 *  7.812   6.043   -22.6 
se  (60.300)    (32.056)          (3.944)     (2.779)       
Main Property Debt                        
Gini  0.925  0.899   -2.8  * 0.440   0.445    1.0 
se  (0.003)    (0.003)          (0.011)     (0.010)       
HSCV  6.671    5.067    -24.1 *  0.464   0.514   10.8 
se  (0.603)    (0.629)          (0.075)     (0.103)       
Other Property Debt                        
Gini  0.984  0.981   -0.3  * 0.579   0.586    1.1 
se  (0.001)    (0.001)          (0.020)     (0.019)       
HSCV  79.107  74.775   -5.5    2.493   2.935    17.7 
se  (17.897)    (11.475)          (0.649)     (0.488)       
Other Debt                          
Gini  0.969  0.965   -0.4  * 0.683   0.674    -1.4 
se  (0.003)    (0.003)          (0.037)     (0.032)       
HSCV  100.788  77.855   -22.8 *  9.250   7.845   -15.2 
se  (42.403)    (30.897)           (4.128)     (3.332)       
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses. Star (*) indicates Gini values are significantly different at the 95% level. 
1  Only those with observed personal share and value are included.
 2 After editing and imputation  
 
3 (final-obs)/obs 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  
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   Observed
1  Final
2    % change
3 
        
Mean  60,235  81,713   35.7 
se  (819)   (1,302)   (58.9) 
          
Mean  if  NW>0  104,466  117,812   12.8 
se  (1,039)  (1,539)    
        
1  -20,000  -20,000   0.0 
5  -3,118  -1,540   -50.6 
10  0  0      
25  0  0      
50  (median)  5,000   15,000   200.0 
75  60,000  96,588   61.0 
90  174,760  208,000   19.0 
95  275,000  313,942   14.2 
99  600,000  729,711   21.6 
          
Gini  0.837  0.787   -6.0 
HSCV  6.791   14.681   116.2 
          
Headcount ratio: FGT(0)  0.451    0.427    -5.4 
Average normalized poverty gap:  FGT(1)  0.828  0.506   -38.9 
Average squared normalized poverty gap: FGT(2)  14.929    9.216   -38.3 
        
N of obs. (cumulated across 5 MI)  73,450     115,675       
N of obs. (basic N)  14,690     23,135       
        
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The asset poverty threshold is set at half the median of net worth. 
1  Only those with observed personal share and value are included.
 2 After editing and imputation  
3 (final-obs)/obs  
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations.  
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  Net worth  Disposable household income per adult 
Unit of Analysis  Individual 
1   Household 
2      Individual 
1  Household 












   (a)   (b)  ( c)   (b)-(a) / (a)  (c)-(b) / (b)  (B)  (C)   (C)-(B) / (B) 
Mean  81,713 81,797  80,011  0.1  -2.2 16,175 16,684  3.1 
se  (1,302) (1,003)  (1,547)             
                
1  -20,000 -20,000  -20,251  0.0  1.3         
5  -1,540 -2,360  -2,646 53.2 12.1         
10  0 0  0  0.0  0.0  7,530  7,439  -1.2 
25  0 1,897  317  0.0  -83.3  10,182  10,264  0.8 
50 (median)  15,000 27,500  20,000 83.3 -27.3  13,932 14,359  3.1 
75  96,588 99,000  93,418  2.5  -5.6 19,430 20,202  4.0 
90  208,000 197,081  198,000  -5.2  0.5  26,289  27,199  3.5 
95  313,942 290,981  298,347  -7.3  2.5  32,345  33,705  4.2 
99  729,711 612,148  632,441  -16.1  3.3  51,294  53,168  3.7 
min  -3,692,144 -1,152,392  -1,152,392  -68.8  0.0         
max  99,221,992 51,763,632  51,763,632  -47.8  0.0         
sum  5.506E+12 5.512E+12  5.642E+12  0.1  2.4         
Inter quartile range (75:25)  96,588 97,103  93,101  0.5  -4.1  9,248  9,938  7.5 
Gini  0.787 0.734  0.762 -6.8 3.9 0.292 0.301  3.4 
se  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007)             
HSCV  14.681 8.695  11.496  -40.8  32.2 0.257  0.303  17.8 
se  (4.575) (2.493)  (3.848)             
Headcount ratio: FGT(0)  0.427 0.413  0.409 -3.1  -1.0  0.140 0.156 11.8 
Average normalized poverty gap: FGT(1)  0.506 0.396  0.430  -21.8  8.7 0.035 0.041 19.4 
Average squared normalized poverty gap: FGT(2)  9.216 1.065  1.491  -88.4  40.0  0.015 0.018 26.6 
N of obs. (cumulated across 5 MI)  115,675  115,675  61,540                
N of obs. (basic N)  23,135  23,135  12,308                
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The asset poverty threshold is set at half the median of net worth. 
1 Data is based on all individuals that have completed the interview  
2 Data is based on all households that have completed the interview. The household may include individuals that do not have completed interviews. 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 8 




  Individual 
1  Individual 
1 (Top coded at 1%) 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Individual  Household 
per capita 
%deviation  
(HH - Ind)/Ind  Individual  Household
per capita 
%deviation  
(HH - Ind)/Ind 
TOTAL             
Gini  0.787 0.734  -6.8  0.756  0.697  -7.8 
se  (0.006) (0.006)    (0.005)  (0.004)   
HSCV  14.681 8.695  -40.8  1.598  1.195  -25.2 
se  (4.575) (2.493)    (0.043)  (0.018)   
 
            
By AGE:             
 
            
Gini             
<=24  0.974 0.758  -22.2  0.968  0.746  -23.0 
25-34  0.975 0.860  -11.7  0.946  0.849  -10.3 
35-44  0.792 0.756  -4.5  0.754  0.708  -6.0 
45-54  0.740 0.709  -4.2  0.684  0.654  -4.5 
55-64  0.693 0.669  -3.4  0.645  0.617  -4.4 
65-74  0.680 0.654  -3.8  0.656  0.628  -4.2 
75+  0.721 0.688  -4.6  0.700  0.666  -4.9 
 
            
HSCV             
<=24  80.403 3.129  -96.1  17.560  1.653  -90.6 
25-34  5.872 8.273  40.9  3.876  2.353  -39.3 
35-44  26.602 22.291  -16.2  1.790  1.269  -29.1 
45-54  23.330 12.136  -48.0  1.113  1.017  -8.6 
55-64  4.027 4.064  0.9  0.925  0.813  -12.1 
65-74  2.087 1.519  -27.2  0.964  0.836  -13.3 
75+  2.291 1.816  -20.7  1.172  0.967  -17.4 
 
            
By GENDER:             
 
            
Gini             
Female  0.788 0.728  -7.6  0.766  0.704  -8.1 
Male  0.782 0.738  -5.6  0.743  0.689  -7.3 
 
            
HSCV             
Female  20.117 9.232  -54.1  1.727  1.235  -28.5 
Male  3.404 8.163  139.8  1.456  1.151  -20.9 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors (100 reps). 
1 Data is based on all individuals that have completed the interview  (n=23135) 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations 
 
Table 9 
The effect of the choice of the aggregation unit and top coding on subgroup indices (net worth, weighted) Discussion Papers   672 
7 Tables 
 
  32  










































Imputed Wealth as a Share of Decile Wealth Imputed Wealth as a Share of Imputed Overall Wealth
 
Source: SOEP 2002; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5: Wealth from the individual vs. the household perspective: “gender wealth gap” 
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Wealth questions in the 2002 SOEP individual questionnaire: 
 
 
The following questions are under the subtitle of “Your personal assets and liabilities” 
 
The accumulation of wealth is an important subject in all levels of society nowadays, especially in view 
of the future for provisions for old age and the reform of pensions. The German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW) in Berlin is currently undertaking a large research project in this field. It is aiming to 
produce an accurate picture of the financial circumstances of the nation’s citizens. We would like to 
invite you to take part in this project. In order to do so, together with you, we would like to create your 
own personal “assets and liabilities statement”, which may also be able to help you gain a better view 
of your finances. You can be absolutely sure that your details will be handled with confidentiality and 
will only be used for economic evaluation. 
+ Please continue to questions A to G on the following pages. 
If you have no information regarding to these questions, then please proceed to question 86 
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Appendix 2 
Comparison of total wealth of private households with national balance sheet 2002 (in billion euros) 
SOEP
1  (2) / (1)      National balance 
sheet 
(1)  (2)  in %  
 
    
Gross wealth (excluding durables)  9,025  6,493  71.9 
Property   4,640  4,526  97.5 
Financial assets I  3,730  1,284  34.4 
Financial assets II 
2  (2.630) (1.284)  (48,8) 
Net business assets 
3  655 683  104.3 
          
Liabilities 
4  1,206 1,119  92.8 
 Mortgages 
4  1,002 939  93.7 
 Other debts 
4 5  204 180  88.2 
          
Net Wealth (excluding durables)  7,819  5,374  68.7 
Net Wealth (excluding durables, 
based on financial assets II)  6,719 5,374  80.0 
          
Durables 
6  968 95  9.8 
1: Sub-samples A-G, imputed wealth information.  
2: Without non-profit-institutions and without currency and transferable deposits, certain claims on insurance 
corporations (for example health insurance and private pension funds) as well as claims from company pension 
commitments all of which are not covered by SOEP-microdata.  
3: Ammermüller et al. (2005), Table 54, p.84. 
4: Nikolaus Bartzsch and Elmar Stöss (2006): Measuring German household debt: Financial accounts data and 
disaggregated survey data as complementary statistics.  Financial accounts of the Deutsche Bundesbank (without 
entrepreneurial loans). Table 10: Financial assets and debt of German households. Prepared for the IFC confer-
ence in Basle, August 2006. 
5: For commercial and consumption purposes. 
6: National balance sheets include all personal belongings (Ammermüller et al. 2005, p. 100). 
Source: Andreas Ammermüller, Andrea M. Weber and Peter Westerheide (2005): Die Entwicklung und Verteilung 
des Vermögens privater Haushalte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Produktivvermögen. Abschlussbericht 
zum Forschungsauftrag des Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung. Zentrum für europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), p. 101. 
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Appendix 3 
Estimating the probability for total gross wealth (TA) and total debt (TD) to be affected by „imputation“ 
(due to item non-response) or by “editing” (because of inconsistency): Probit model with Heckman sample 
selection correction 
  Imputed TA  Imputed or edited TA  Imputed TD  Imputed or edited TD 








Variable  coeff  std.dev.   coeff  std.dev.   coeff  std.dev.   coeff  std.dev.  
          
Age  -.0012  (.0050) .0040 (.0048) -.0086 (.0093) -.0194** (.0083)
Age (squared)  .0014  (.0470) -.0450 (.0456) .0748 (.0840) .1486** (.0754)
Male  -.0640***  (.0198) -.0648*** (.0192) -.1266*** (.0266) -.0969*** (.0241)
Migrant  .0646  (.0396) .1088*** (.0377) .0463 (.0515) .0449 (.0470)
Low education   -.0288  (.0342) .0852*** (.0324) .0077 (.0439) .0828** (.0395)
High education  -.0894***  (.0252) -.0990*** (.0243) -.1398*** (.0329) -.1353*** (.0297)
Children in household  -.0566**  (.0243) .0278 (.0235) .0372 (.0368) .0496 (.0336)
Lived in  .0455*  (.0237) -.0002 (.0231) .0881** (.0352) .1229*** (.0316)
Self employed  .2251***  (.0376) .1336*** (.0371) .0674 (.0474) -.0339 (.0435)
Civil servant   -.0572  (.0441) -.0761* (.0424) -.0658 (.0560) -.0932* (.0503)
Number of interviews  -.0092***  (.0021) -.0115*** (.0020) -.0036 (.0028) -.0025 (.0026)
Interview mode:  .0338  (.0266) .0882*** (.0257) -.0333 (.0356) .0586* (.0325)
Interview mode: CAPI   .6174***  (.0261) .6492*** (.0266) .1163*** (.0352) .1561*** (.0325)
Interview mode: Postal   .3556***  (.0362) .4085*** (.0357) .3233*** (.0482) .3596*** (.0453)
Constant  -.4557***  (.1438) -.3304** (.1392 -.4431 (.2910 .2259 (.2564
  TA=yes TA=yes TD=yes TD=yes
Age  .0567***  (.0038) .0553*** (.0038) .1054*** (.0038) .1049*** (.0038)
Age (squared)  -.4292***  (.0397) -.4155*** (.0395) -.8413*** (.0392) -.8382*** (.0390)
Male  .0794***  (.0209) .0782*** (.0208) .0814*** (.0186) .0808*** (.0186)
Married  .4558***  (.0253) .4654*** (.0250) .5262*** (.0220) .5359*** (.0217)
Migrant  -.6625***  (.0295) -.6668*** (.0295) -.4576*** (.0287) -.4582*** (.0287)
Low education  -.4466***  (.0252) -.4465*** (.0251) -.2909*** (.0252) -.2920*** (.0252)
High education  .1587***  (.0323) .1641*** (.0322) .0385 (.0246) .0410* (.0246)
Children in household (< 14 yrs)  .0406  (.0262) .0370 (.0261) .2777*** (.0238) .2728*** (.0238)
Rural area  .2554***  (.0275) .2562*** (.0273) .3543*** (.0240) .3482*** (.0238)
Metropolitan area   -.0956***  (.0310) -.1023*** (.0307) -.2831*** (.0280) -.2850*** (.0276)
Lived in East Germany in 1989  -.0635**  (.0271) -.0725*** (.0271) -.4106*** (.0245) -.4094*** (.0244)
Unemployed   -.5596***  (.0418) -.5657*** (.0413) -.2411*** (.0411) -.2412*** (.0405)
Self employed   .3124***  (.0597) .3078*** (.0594) .2709*** (.0405) .2740*** (.0404)
Pensioner  -.1209***  (.0444) -.1338*** (.0439) -.1567*** (.0370) -.1514*** (.0365)
Not employed (out of labor  -.3404***  (.0307) -.3474*** (.0302) -.2354*** (.0306) -.2285*** (.0302)
Civil servant   .3493***  (.0740) .3414*** (.0738) .2723*** (.0471) .2705*** (.0470)
Number of Interviews  .0019  (.0024) .0022 (.0024) -.0038* (.0020) -.0037* (.0020)
Interview mode: self admin.   .1560***  (.0272) .1554*** (.0271) .1514*** (.0240) .1488*** (.0240)
Interview mode: CAPI   .1601***  (.0264) .1617*** (.0263) .0847*** (.0237) .0817*** (.0237)
Interview mode: Postal   .1890***  (.0370) .1911*** (.0369) .1734*** (.0332) .1712*** (.0332)
Equivalent Pre-Gov’t Income  .0126***  (.0006) .0123*** (.0006) .0056*** (.0004) .0055*** (.0004)
Constant  1.2486***  (.0924) -1.2074*** (.0922) -3.3137*** (.0953) -3.300*** (.0950)
/athrho  .0272  (.0709) -.3468*** (.0684) -.1970*** (.0691) -.4782*** (.0641)
LR test on indep. equations  0.15   25.43*** 7.77***   52.52***
Number of obs  23892  23892 23892  23892
Censored obs  5707  5707 11897   11897
Uncensored obs  18185  18185 11995  11995
Wald chi2(14)  895.83***  990.70*** 137.02***  198.08***
Log lik (full model)  -21200.08  -21708.02 -18865.85  -19813.89
      
Note: *** sig. at 1% level; ** sig. at 5% level; * sig. at 10%level. 
Model A looks only at the probability of Item non-response (and the consequential need for imputation), Model B 
analyses correlates of both types of measurement error (Item non-response as well as inconsistency). 







































%  Total % 
owner-occupied 
property  
57,4 29,5  4,0  4,6  2,1  2,4 100 
debt owner-occupied 
property 
57,4 30,9  2,3  5,0  2,1  2,4 100 
other property  83,4 9,5  0,4  1,9  0,5  4,4  100 
debt other property  83,4 10,4  0,2  1,2  0,5  4,4 100 
financial assets  51,5 35,0  0,0  7,6  2,5  3,4 100 
private pension  45,8 34,8  0,0  13,8  2,9  2,7 100 
business assets  89,9 3,5  0,0  1,5  0,3  4,9  100 
tangible assets  85,0 6,8  0,0  2,5  0,2  5,5  100 
consumer debts  83,9 9,4  0,0  1,5  0,2  5,0  100 
no                                           yes                                   no answer 
filter = yes  no answer  yes
yes              no 
(metric) value stated ?         imputation of filter information 
filter = no  
(metric) value consistent?
Filter information stated ? 